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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Beverly Mentor appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, which granted a motion by her former employer, Hillside Board 
of Education (Hillside), for summary judgment on her claims of racial discrimination in 
violation of Title VII.  We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s grant of 
summary judgment.  Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999).  We 
will affirm. 
 Hillside‟s Calvin Coolidge Elementary School principal, Dr. Ellen Decker, hired 
Mentor, an African-American woman, as a part-time cafeteria aide in November of 2003.  
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Although Mentor was authorized to work two hours per day in this position, her hours 
subsequently exceeded 20 hours per week as she also worked as a breakfast and bus aide.  
During the 2005-2006 school year, Dr. Decker died.  Her position was filled by Dr. Frank 
Deo and Ms. Grace Conway.  Before the end of the school year, both administrators had 
concerns as to whether Mentor, whose daughter was in the third grade at the school, 
should continue as a cafeteria aide at Calvin Coolidge.  This concern arose because, inter 
alia, Mentor, while working as a bus aide, confronted the parent of a student who 
allegedly bullied Mentor‟s daughter in class.  This resulted in a complaint from the 
parent.  After addressing the parent‟s complaint, Ms. Conway explained to Mentor that 
she was not entitled, as a bus aide, to address with other parents her concerns about a 
student‟s in-class behavior.  
In order to avoid future confrontations of this nature, Dr. Deo and Ms. Conway 
proposed transferring Mentor to another school where Mentor could not interact with her 
daughter or with other Calvin Coolidge students and parents.  The Board of Education 
approved the transfer.  In the 2006-2007 school year, Mentor was assigned as a cafeteria 
aide at Hurden Looker Elementary School.  Near the end of the school year, faced with 
fiscal cuts for the next school year, the administration at Hurden Looker reduced the 
number of aides to be employed for the following year.  Because Mentor was the last aide 
assigned to the school, her position was terminated. 
 Mentor filed several charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), alleging racial discrimination.  On February 1, 2008, the EEOC 
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terminated the administrative processing of Mentor‟s claims and provided her with right 
to sue letters.  The following month, Mentor, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint 
alleging that Hillside had violated Title VII by discriminating against her on the basis of 
her race.  Mentor requested an appointment of counsel.  Hillside moved for summary 
judgment.  In a memorandum filed August 5, 2009, the District Court construed Mentor‟s 
complaint as raising claims of racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.  It 
granted Hillside‟s motion for summary judgment on both of her claims and denied 
Mentor‟s request for appointed counsel. 
This timely appeal followed.
1
  Thereafter, pro bono counsel was appointed.
2
   
Mentor submits that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on her Title 
VII claim because she established a prima facie case of race discrimination and she 
rebutted Hillside‟s proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reason for reducing her hours 
and transferring her to the Hurden Looker school.
3
  We agree with Mentor that she 
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  See Jones, 198 F.3d at 411-12.  
But because Hillside proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for reducing 
Mentor‟s hours and transferring her to the Hurden Looker school, Mentor was obligated 
                                                 
1
   The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
2
   We thank pro bono counsel for representing Mentor on appeal.  
 
3
   Mentor has not challenged the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on her Title 
VII retaliation claim.  The issue is therefore waived.  Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster 
Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises 
it in its opening brief, and for those purposes „a passing reference to an issue . . . will not 
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to show that these reasons were pretextual.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  Our review of the record fails to reveal any evidence that discredits Hillside‟s 
explanation that Mentor‟s hours were reduced consistent with the nature of her part-time 
position as a cafeteria aide and because of budgetary restraints.   
As to Mentor‟s transfer to the Hurden Looker school, she contends that Hillside‟s 
reason is unworthy of belief because other non-African-American employees raised 
concerns about their children with the administration but were not transferred.  
Presuming that to be true (although the record before us does not support it), this 
allegation does not cast doubt on Hillside‟s proffered explanation.  First, Mentor‟s 
transfer was not based on the fact that she voiced to the administration her private 
concern about her daughter being bullied in class by another student.  That concern was 
promptly addressed by Ms. Conway, who spoke with the teacher and Dr. Deo.  Mentor 
acknowledged during her deposition that, after the teacher got involved, her daughter 
stopped complaining about the other student.  Rather, Mentor was transferred because, 
despite the school‟s intervention and remediation of the bullying issue, Mentor 
confronted the parent of the alleged bully.  Mentor‟s status as a bus aide did not grant her 
authority to address issues concerning in-class behavior with parents.  Because Mentor 
took the bullying issue into her own hands in her capacity as an employee, she was not 
similarly situated to the other employees who brought concerns to the administration.  
We conclude that Mentor has not demonstrated that Hillside‟s proffered reason was 
                                                                                                                                                             
suffice to bring that issue before this court.‟”). 
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pretextual.  Accordingly, we will not disturb the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment for Hillside on Mentor‟s Title VII discrimination claim. 
In our order appointing counsel, we requested that counsel address whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying Mentor‟s motion to appoint counsel.  The 
District Court focused on the analysis set out in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-158 
(3d Cir. 1993).  This was error.  Mentor sought counsel to assist her in prosecuting her 
Title VII claims, and Title VII contains its own provision regarding appointed counsel.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 979-80 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (enumerating test to apply in ruling on a motion for counsel under § 2000e-
5(f)(1)).  This error does not require reversal and remand, however.  Regardless of 
whether we review the District Court‟s order under Tabron or § 2000e-5(f)(1), Mentor 
must show as a threshold matter that her claim had merit.  Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155; Ficken, 
146 F.3d at 980.  As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Mentor cannot satisfy this 
requirement. 
Mentor contends, however, that the District Court erred in denying her motion for 
the appointment of counsel because it failed to recognize that she had a meritorious First 
Amendment retaliation claim.
4
  According to Mentor, her hours were reduced and she 
was transferred to Hurden Looker because of her private complaint about her daughter 
                                                 
4
   Mentor also asserts that her right to due process was violated because the District Court 
provided her with a form complaint for discrimination under Title VII, which “rendered 
her incapable of drafting a complaint” asserting her claim for retaliation in violation of 
her First Amendment rights.  This novel argument does not warrant relief here as Mentor 
has had a meaningful opportunity to be heard.   
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being bullied and her persistence in requesting the bully‟s transfer to another classroom.  
Mentor did not raise this claim below.  “This court has consistently held that it will not 
consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”  Harris v. City of Phila., 35 
F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).
5
   
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
5
   We have relaxed this practice “where a gross miscarriage of justice would occur[.]”  
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing 
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1940)).  We are not persuaded that a gross 
miscarriage of justice would result here.   
 
